аЯрЁБс>ўџ BDўџџџAџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџьЅСq` №П†$bjbjqPqP .0::`%џџџџџџЄ       т т т 8 . iЖN N "p p p p p p шъъъъъъ$h‡z иp p ии  p p #xxxи” p p шxишxx  xp B @‚—v€Щт ldxш90ixањx xpp Ђ˜xЊОp p p ЪЎp p p iииииФт т       џџџџ A Question of Motivation. Jim Cuthbert Margaret Cuthbert August 2008 On July 29th, in the wake of the historic Glasgow East by-election result, a very significant article was published in the Guardian by Robert Hazell, the Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London. The thrust of the article could be paraphrased as – don’t panic chaps: the Scots have a difficult obstacle course to surmount on the road to independence: and they are unlikely to succeed, particularly since we, (the UK), can quietly manipulate the height of the obstacles. The article is valuable because it gives an unparalleled insight into emerging Establishment thinking: but more so, because fore-warned is fore-armed, so enabling Scotland to work out the appropriate tactics in response. The main part of the Guardian article sets out the hurdles which would have to be overcome on the road to independence. These are as follows. First would be the need to obtain a majority in the Scottish Parliament for a Referendum Bill: followed, of course, by the need for a yes vote in the ensuing referendum. But this would only be the start. The referendum would authorise the Scottish Government to start negotiations with the British Government on the terms of independence: and the article states that some of these terms “would be unwelcome”. After that, Scotland would need to re-apply for membership of the EU: renewed membership would not be guaranteed. Once these negotiations, with the rest of Britain, and Europe, had been concluded, the outcome would represent the terms of independence. The people of Scotland would deserve a separate vote on these: so a second referendum, on the terms of independence, would be the final hurdle to clear. All this is straightforward enough: but what is really interesting is the following hint about how the UK, while declaring itself fully in respect of the principle of self-determination for Scotland, could nevertheless control the process. Consider the following quotation from Hazell’s article:-“Other EU states would look at how strongly the UK supported Scotland’s application. That in turn might depend on the outcome of the negotiations on other big issues: North Sea oil, division of the national debt, the future of the defence bases on the Clyde.” The underlying message is clear: of course we believe in self determination: but you have to convince Europe as well as Westminster – and Europe will never agree unless we send them the right signals. It is very instructive to compare this aspect of the Guardian article with what happened in 1922, as Ireland was moving towards independence from the UK. In May 1922, the Colonial Office in Downing Street wrote to the Provisional Government in Dublin, at the request of Churchill, the Colonial Secretary. The letter was about how the Free State would stand in relation to the various international treaties of which the UK was a signatory. Effectively, the letter gave an undertaking that the UK Government would take all necessary steps to ensure that any existing treaties applied equally to the Free State, if this was what the Free State desired. This position contrasts markedly with the tone of the Guardian article. What is the main difference between then and now? The answer is, primarily, a question of motivation. The Guardian article is drafted from the viewpoint of a UK establishment which cannot imagine itself ever being motivated to want to participate positively in the process of Scotland achieving independence. In contrast, in 1922, the establishment had come to the opposite view in respect of what was to become the Republic of Ireland. Could Scotland ever hope to motivate Westminster adequately? Absolutely: all it would take would be for a determined and united Scottish block of Westminster MPs to hold the balance of power in a future UK parliament, and Westminster’s heart and mind would follow pretty quickly. There is, of course, a good Irish precedent, in the position that Parnell and his group of Irish MPs occupied in the House of Commons in the 1880s. There is a tendency to undervalue what Parnell and the Irish achieved then, perhaps because, partly through his personal failings, Parnell failed to achieve immediate Home Rule for Ireland. But it was through Parnell, articulating the popular support harnessed by Davitt’s Land League, that the fundamental Land Acts were passed, which transformed land tenure in Ireland, and which ultimately broke the UK’s determination to cling on to the South. Parnell illustrates how Parliamentary pressure can force fundamental change on a reluctant establishment: and there is no reason why the Scots could not achieve the same. So the answer, in the last resort, lies with us, and not with the Constitution Unit. If we apply sufficient pressure at Westminster, there is no need for us to feel defeatist about negotiations with the UK government, nor to fear that a UK government may put obstacles in Scotland’s way in the negotiations that will be required with Europe. Nor is there any need for Scotland to feel defeatist about the European negotiations themselves. What is important is that we approach these negotiations in the right way. Anyone who approaches a negotiation as a supplicant is going to come out with a bad deal. Our approach to Europe should surely be: can you, Europe, persuade us that it is worth our while being in the EU, rather than an independent country out of the EU: and, if Scotland is a member, it must be on terms that suit us. In particular, we should be very sceptical about any requirement for an independent Scotland to join the Euro: as our experience in the UK monetary union indicates, it has proved impossible to devise a monetary policy that fits all parts of the UK simultaneously. It will be much more difficult to find a one-size-fits-all monetary policy for the whole of Europe: as demonstrated by the difficulties currently being experienced in Ireland, and elsewhere. Overall, it would be unwise for any unionist to take too much comfort from the rather patronising and dismissive tone of the Hazell article. What Hazell fails to do is to consider the potential dynamics of the current situation: and the transformation in attitudes, both in Scotland and England, which could result from factors like a strong SNP performance at Holyrood: the unfortunate degree of anti-Scottish sentiment currently being whipped up in England: the possibility of a ham-fisted attempt to settle the West Lothian question: or a cohesive and motivated group of Scottish Westminster MPs holding the balance of power at Westminster. Finally, there is a good deal that could be done now to facilitate the eventual independence negotiations. To give an example: Hazell makes play with the problem of apportioning the UK national debt. This is in itself somewhat misleading: the counterpart of the national debt is the worth of the assets which the public sector owns: and currently the UK public sector has positive net worth. 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