ࡱ> UWTY  5bjbjWW !p==0]||||8 |(      lnnn/ $x          l$,P, lll  `it||(lOpposing but not Imposing Jim Cuthbert Margaret Cuthbert A conventional view has been that successful implementation of devolution would neuter the SNP. The pressure for independence would disappear once Scotland had control of its own domestic agenda while continuing to enjoy access to the presumed benefits of the Union. We argue that the SNP has indeed been damaged by devolution. The damage, however, has come from failures in the implementation of devolution, rather than from its success: this has profound implications for the strategy to be adopted by the new SNP leadership. Here we identify four fundamental failures in implementing devolution, all of which have impacted adversely on the SNP. While the primary blame for these failures rests with the parties in government, nevertheless, overall responsibility for the way devolution has been implemented rests with the Scottish body politic as a whole, including the opposition parties. First, there has been the failure of the new parliament to establish proper financial responsibility and control. The most visible example of this has been Holyrood: but there have been other mistakes, and some are arguably even more damaging: for example, the way in which new financial controls for Scottish water were implemented, leading to serious overcharging: the inadequate costing of free personal care for the elderly: the laxity in the way in which the McCrone agreement on teachers pay and conditions was introduced: and, perhaps most significant of all, the failure to recognise the gravity of the financial situation facing the health service where, because of the Barnett squeeze, there is not the head room that exists in England to introduce new approaches and new technology. The above examples suggest a failure on the part of officials to make sure that sound financial discipline was implemented. Perhaps officials did not appreciate the extent to which devolution would disrupt the close day-to-day working relationships which exist between government departments and the Treasury, and that it would be necessary post-devolution to make an extra effort to establish the equivalent of normal Treasury control. In addition, the Gordon Brown spending boom set a context where the Scottish Executive was not operating under any severe financial constraints, and so financial discipline was not an obvious over-riding priority. The consequence of poor financial discipline has not just been that the credibility of the new parliament has been damaged: it has also contributed greatly to the impression of Scottish dependency on largesse from Westminster. Second, there has been a failure to establish proper mechanisms for scrutinising the operation of the Executive. One example is the poor quality of the monitoring information published by the Executive, as anyone who has tried to understand what underlies the Executives spending plans will attest. Most significant, however, has been the failure of the system of parliamentary committees to develop an independent and probing scrutiny role. Far from being a semi-independent scrutiny mechanism, the committee system has become an extension of the party political process. One reason for these failures of scrutiny relates to the attitudes of officials. Coming from the background of the old Scottish Office, which was largely insulated from democratic scrutiny, some officials are undoubtedly reluctant to be open. Indeed, one senior official argued that MSPs and Committees were too inexperienced and immature to be provided with disaggregated budget information. This might suggest an element of contempt for the very concept of public oversight. Underlying the tight grip which the governing parties have kept on the committee system there appears to be a lack of confidence: (this is perhaps not surprising, given the extent of media comment on the poor quality of current ministerial talent). The Executive have not realised that, if a parliament does not have a voice of its own, exercised through committees performing a genuine scrutiny role, then the whole project is in danger of becoming just an expensive puppet theatre. The lack of adequate scrutiny has contributed to the general dumbing down of the political process, which means that issues tend not to be fully understood and that wrong decisions are much more likely to be made. It also contributes to a certain mis-placed deference towards perceived authority which is an unfortunate feature of current Scottish culture: that is to say, it is not for us to understand issues and make our own decisions, but to follow what presumed experts advise us to do. Thirdly, there has been the failure to establish a satisfactory interface with Whitehall and Westminster. One symptom is Scotlands failure to benefit fully from key reserved programmes, (that is, programmes which should be run for the benefit of the whole of the UK), including trade, science, and tourism. The same is true for European decision making and funding. It can also be seen in the failure of Scotlands Westminster MPs either to have developed a clear role for themselves post-devolution, or to necessarily identify with Scotlands interests. It is scarcely credible, for example, that substantial numbers of Scotlands Westminster MPs voted for top-up fees and foundation hospitals in England, when the effect of these measures, given the way the Barnett formula works, will be to penalise Scotland financially. The Executive have not grasped how important the interface with Whitehall is, and have not realised that, psychologically, devolution has made English departments more inward looking: English departments have tended to run reserved programmes as if they were devolved programmes for England. Meanwhile, the interface mechanism, the Scotland Office, has been downgraded. As regards the failure of Scotlands Westminster MPs, a primary reason appears to be self-interest. The Labour government at Westminster is critically dependent on the votes of Scotlands Labour MPs: the biggest threat to Labour nationally would be if these MPs were to pursue a distinctively Scottish agenda. Fourth is the failure to establish an effective opposition. As the largest opposition party, the blame for this must rest primarily with the SNP - although none of the opposition parties has performed well. The symptoms are clear to see - quite simply the Executive has got away with the above failures without the opposition exposing them to public ridicule. A primary reason for this is that the SNP has been seduced into taking the new parliament at face value. A new parliament can be a seductive place for an opposition party: there is a natural feeling of self-importance, nurtured by carefully measured doses of flattery from the Establishment: there is the consuming drudgery of debates and committees - how busy everyone is, even if the activity is largely designed to keep the opposition, (and back bench government MSPs), out of mischief: and there is a natural element of goodwill towards the new institution, so that perhaps the opposition is too inclined to give the benefit of the doubt when civil servants do not provide information, or when advisers produce questionable advice. The upshot is that the SNP have participated in a lot of activity which amounts to an empty charade: (there is little point in participating in parliamentary committees if the government parties are in an automatic majority and vote as a block). The SNP have too readily accepted the agenda as set by the Executive: (section 28 and fox hunting are irrelevancies compared with the social and economic malaise of west central Scotland.) But above all, the opposition has failed to bring home to the Scottish public the flawed nature of Holyroods processes as identified above. What has been the wider effect of these failings. This has to be viewed in the context of a Scotland whose economy has chronically under-performed: which almost uniquely has a declining population: and which, as a recent study indicates, contains in Glasgow one of the UKs worst concentrations of poverty. Far from devolution bringing a new dawn, the tragedy is that there is little evidence, even after five years, of the development of constructive policies designed to tackle these problems. Indeed, in many respects devolution has meant stepping backwards. For example, as regards business taxation, the Executive has abandoned the policy of uniform non-domestic rates across the UK in favour of higher non-domestic rates in Scotland. It has also, in effect, invented an entirely new tax for businesses in Scotland, in terms of needlessly high water charges. As regards access to some of the key DTI programmes designed to assist industrial development, like the LINK programme, the situation post-devolution is that these programmes are less likely to be tailored towards the needs of Scottish industry than they were before. Despite the gravity of these wider implications, our concern is with the impact of the failures of devolution on the SNP. These failures threaten the SNP in a number of ways - fiscal indiscipline makes us look continuingly dependent: the failure to mobilise Scotlands Westminster MPs blocks off what should be the primary dynamic for change in British politics. But the main effect arises because having a dumbed down, unsuccessful parliament feeds the peculiar inferiority complex of the Scots: if we cannot even manage devolution successfully - if, in fact, it is a bit of a joke - how could we possibly move forward to independence. Because of this deep-rooted Scottish cringe, the paradox of devolution is that, even though the failures of devolution are primarily down to the parties in power, the adverse effects are to a large extent felt by the SNP. What does this mean for the new leadership of the SNP. First of all, there is a requirement for a new kind of opposition in the Scottish parliament. Playing the role of a conventional opposition, that is, picking up policy points, is largely a waste of time within the context of the current flawed set-up. The SNP should take a step back and concentrate on process. They should identify the shortcomings in procedure in the parliament and they should hammer these points, both in the parliament and in the media, until they are put right. There are two big advantages to this course of action. First, it will operate on the expectations of the Scottish people: they must be convinced that government is not a matter of mystique and there is no inherent reason that Scotland has to put up with a dumbed down parliament. Moreover, if the SNP can convince the public that the SNP are the primary engine for improvement in the processes of devolution, this prepares the ground for further change ahead. Secondly, the SNP must develop a much more coherent strategy towards Westminster. The ultimate aim should be to have Scotlands Westminster MPs of all parties operating as a block which acts with Scotlands interests primarily at heart. The only lever the SNP has, but it is potentially a powerful one, is through the example set by the SNPs Westminster MPs. To date this group has had little impact, primarily because they appear to lack a clear role. The new leadership needs to articulate the role for this group. We suggest this role should involve two main functions. First would be the detailed scrutiny of the operation of the reserved powers of Westminster, as they affect Scotland in areas like trade, industry, Europe, tourism, transport and energy. The other main function would be to champion Scotlands budgetary interests: given that Barnett is driven by the spending decisions which Westminster makes for England on matters like Health and Education, Scottish MPs must play an active role in English domestic politics, since this is Scotlands only democratic means of influencing the largest component of the Scottish budget. In effect, the West Lothian question requires to be stood on its head. The challenge for the SNP is therefore clear. But there is also a challenge for the parties in government as well. Since, as we have argued, the failures of devolution tend to damage the SNP, this in a sense gives the parties in government a vested interest in failure, or at least in running a chronically dumbed down parliament. This is a temptation which they must resist. In the long run, a chronically failing Scottish parliament is not a sustainable model. 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